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The Vulnerability of ‘Self-Help’: Women and Microfinance in
South India
K. Kalpana 
Summary
Self-help groups (SHGs) play a major role in providing microfinance in India. But
they do not work alone. State institutions are also a big part of the microfinance
landscape. They promote and finance SHGs, and also interact directly with them.
How does this kind of ‘institutionalised co-production’ in service delivery work in
practice? 
My research shows that the relationships are not symmetrical. When they seek
access to bank credit, women’s groups are in a dependent relationship, and are
subject to, and tarnished by, the institutional imperatives, systemic corruption and
political compulsions that shape the behaviour of rural development bureaucracies
and banks. Part of the problem lies in a legacy of bank staff mistrusting borrowers
due to arrears from previous credit granted under a different set of public
schemes. Banks still try to recover old loans, and sometimes grant new loans to
womens’ SHGs conditional on repayments by their male relatives. Women 
consider the ways in which bank officials assess credit-worthiness of SHGs as
sometimes being discriminatory and suggestive of caste-profiling. Since banks, as
institutions, are not very sensitive to the realities of their SHG borrowers, the 
quality of the relationship often depends on the attitude of the bank’s branch-
manager. Success in accessing loans is often contingent on how SHGs, bank
staff, government officers and non-government organisations collude to subvert
the official objective of the loan programme – enterprise-promotion. Manufacturing
evidence about non-existent enterprises involves substantial costs and risks for
SHGs. 
Providing financial services in rural India is now a profitable venture and is 
attracting private financing institutions, including transnational banks. My research
suggests that we need to enquire further into the power dynamics that underlie
relationships between the poor people using the financial services and their
providers.
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1 Introduction 
There is an increasing awareness that there is a market for financial services
among poor people in the rural and urban areas of developing countries. Many
new organisational arrangements involving different institutional actors have
evolved in recent years. We are also seeing innovations in lending technologies
that allow these markets to be tapped effectively at reduced transaction costs.
One popular strategy is to forge financial linkages between formal credit 
institutions, on one side, and on the other, various semi-formal financial service
providers and informal community-based groups of poor people (Pagura and
Kirsten 2006). 
A significant institutional arrangement for the delivery of financial services to the
poor is the ‘promoter’ model of microcredit (Rutherford 2000) ‘wherein agencies,
usually development non-government organisations (NGOs), provide training and
other support services to help poor people set up credit systems that are owned,
controlled and managed by the poor themselves. In India, the main mode of
accessing microcredit, especially for poor women is through neighbourhood-based
peer groups or self help groups (SHGs). They begin by pooling savings for use as
intra-group loans. User-managed and member-controlled, SHGs which are some-
times called ‘micro-banks’ (Harper 2002a) and ‘community-managed loan funds’
(Murray and Rosenberg 2006) are also part of the promoter model. 
Along with the growth of SHGs in India since the 1990s, innovative schemes too
have developed, to encourage financial linkages between SHGs and formal 
banking institutions. The aim was to improve the use of the country’s well-
established nationalised banking infrastructure, and to help poor people 
(previously seen as credit-unworthy) have better access to credit. In 1999, the
state introduced an anti-poverty programme (the SwarnJayanti Gram Swarozgar
Yojana) that uses SHGs as organisational channels to deliver credit-cum-subsidy
assistance to households below the official poverty line, to encourage poor people
set up self-employment activities. Anti-poverty programmes such as this, although
different in intent and design from the credit linkage schemes, open up legitimate
ways for SHGs to source credit-based development resources from banks. 
How can we conceptualise these linkages between informal, community-based
women’s groups and formal institutions, in the context of the state’s develop-
mental policies and how they are delivered? Research on effective public service
delivery shows that organisational arrangements involving direct users of services,
assume unconventional or even ‘hybrid’ forms, often blurring the boundaries which
divide the public sector from the private. ‘Institutionalised co-production’ (Joshi
and Moore 2004) – the provision of public services through regular relationships
between state agencies and organised citizens’ groups – is a useful framework to
understand how SHGs work with public sector banks and the state’s rural 
administrative departments. 
Various state institutions play a key role in the SHGs-based microfinance 
landscape in India. They promote and finance SHGs which involves their direct
interaction with village-level women’s groups. SHGs too pro-actively seek to 
cultivate and strengthen relationships with public sector banks and state rural
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administrative departments, which increases their direct interaction with these
institutions. Government literature and independent research on SHGs is 
generally positive about these relationships and sees the very existence of such
relationships as evidence of women’s empowerment. 
It is true that SHGs bring opportunities for women’s grassroots collectives to build
contacts with influential people and gain access to those in power. My research
too has found that several SHG members have been able to widen their social
network. However, SHGs’ interactions with powerful institutional actors – the terms
on which women’s groups are accepted within bank lending practices and 
poverty-alleviation programmes – need to be clarified. We need to understand
how SHGs negotiate their interests when they face overwhelming pressures. 
My research shows that SHG members’ access to bank credit and credit-based
development schemes does not automatically or easily follow when SHGs are
formed and functioning successfully. Women’s groups seeking bank credit are
subject to pressures such as rules and other requirements of the banks, and 
corruption and political compulsions of the state rural administrative departments.
Whilst on one hand, the relationship between public agencies and societal actors
is collaborative, on the other it is often marked by conflict, tension and 
antagonism. 
In this paper, I try to show how asymmetrical power relations and privilege inform
the co-production relationship and how these are played out in the interactions
between women’s groups and the institutions. I highlight some of the struggles
women go through to secure credit and the high social and financial costs SHGs
have to bear. Through my discussions of the interactions between poor women
and state institutions, I raise the larger issue of poor people’s vulnerability to the
imperatives of the service providers. This is important in a context where private
sector ‘global banks’, such as the ICICI, identify microfinance as a strategy
towards ‘leveraging the rural economy’ to ‘break into the top league of global
banks’1 and corporate bodies are eager to do business with the ‘bottom of the
pyramid’ (RBI 2005).
I draw from interviews with NGOs actively involved in microcredit in different 
districts of Tamil Nadu (a state in South India), and from fieldwork done as part of
my PhD dissertation, among 27 SHGs in three villages of a district in northern
Tamil Nadu between February 2005 and April 2006. The 27 SHGs of this study
ranged from three to seven years in age. Only groups that completed three years
of age were selected for the study in order to ensure that they possessed consid-
erable experience in SHG functioning. All groups were exclusively women’s
groups and were, for the most part, caste-segregated. Of the 27, 15 SHGs were
composed entirely of the Scheduled Castes, 10 of the Backward Castes and 
2 were mixed-caste (both SC and BC).2 The number of members per SHG ranged
from 16 to 20. (A note on the livelihood context of the three villages and on the
methodology of the study is provided in Annex 1.) 
1 Knowledge@Wharton (2006).
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2 The policy context of SHG 
financing
When sourcing credit through government schemes SHGs deal with two types of
organisations:
(a) banks – including nationalised commercial banks, regional rural banks and 
cooperative banks, and 
(b) the District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) at the district level, and the 
Block Development Office (BDO) at the sub-district level (both are state 
institutions). 
An SHG, usually soon after it is formed, opens an account in the nearest bank,
which it uses for regular savings (usually weekly). Later, the SHG may try for a
loan from the bank through subsidised or non-subsidised schemes. Banks are
therefore key financiers of SHGs. The DRDA has been designated by the state, to
implement subsidised, self-employment promotion schemes meant for SHGs. The
subsidy component, for subsidised loan schemes, is provided by the DRDA and
the BDO and the loan is provided by the bank. The loan and subsidy are routed to
the SHG through the bank. Banks have been interacting with SHGs since 1992,
when the linkage schemes were started, but the BDO and the DRDA entered the
arena after the SwarnJayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) was introduced in
April 1999.
The emergence and expansion of SHG banking in India can be also explained by
‘logistical drivers’ (Joshi and Moore 2004), which account for the origin of co-
production arrangements in sectors such as public health, microcredit, irrigation or
sanitation. Public sector banks, in the past, had failed to serve rural poor people
effectively due to high transaction costs involved in meeting the credit needs of a
geographically dispersed group and in providing safe saving opportunities to small
savers. The reason for the SHG – bank linkage programme’s emergence – is 
officially attributed to this failure. Government policy documents are also self-
critical, acknowledging that the social distance between banks and poor people,
reflected by ‘urban mindsets’ and orientation of bank officials and ‘inflexibility’ in
their operations, had created a perception of the bank as an ‘alien institution’
inaccessible to the poor (NABARD 1999). 
A scheme, initiated in 1991–92 as a pilot project, linked 500 SHGs to banks, and
was later mainstreamed as a component of routine banking business in April
1996.3 The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the National Bank for Agriculture and
Rural Development (NABARD)4 promoted SHG-banking vigorously and provided
2 The government categorises caste groups as Backward classes (BCs), Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes in increasing order of social oppression and deprivation. The term ‘backward castes’
as I use it refers to SHG members belonging to the government classified ‘backward classes’ who 
rank higher on the caste hierarchy than the Scheduled Castes or Dalits. The two groups (SCs and 
BCs) usually live in segregated fashion in separate hamlets in rural Tamil Nadu. So much so, most 
SHGs have exclusive members of SCs or BCs.
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3 An account of how a pilot project was eventually incorporated as part of corporate bank strategy is 
available in NABARD (1999); Dasgupta (2001); Kropp and Suran (2002).
4 National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development is an apex development bank established in 
1982 with the mandate of facilitating credit flow to agriculture and small scale industries, supporting all
allied economic activities in rural areas and promoting sustainable rural development. NABARD also 
functions as an apex refinancing agency for all institutions that provide investment and production 
credit to rural areas. NABARD encourages credit innovations of NGOs and other non-formal agencies 
and promotes SHGs in order to extend formal banking services to the rural poor. Towards these ends, 
NABARD liaises with the Government of India, State Governments, the Reserve Bank of India (the 
Central Bank of the country) and other national institutions concerned with policy formulation 
(www.nabard.org).
5 Banks are mandated to direct 40 per cent of net bank credit to designated priority sectors which 
include agriculture, small scale industries, small business, self-employed persons, small-scale retail 
trade, small road and water transport operators, etc.
institutional incentives to banks for lending to SHGs. Early measures that tried to
create a conducive policy climate to facilitate SHG-banking include incorporating
SHG-banking as part of priority sector lending5 and NABARD re-finance at lower
interest rates of all bank loans made to SHGs. Borrowing from NABARD at 
concessional interest rates gives commercial banks an interest spread or margin
of around 5 per cent on loans made to SHGs. Using SHGs as grassroots 
intermediaries lowered the transaction costs for banks. They were also able to
meet their targets for lending to designated ‘weaker sections’.
The linkage scheme provided non-subsidised loans depending on the amount
saved by a group. This was an innovative attempt by the banks to offer credit
without any collateral, which the poor people could use for consumption purposes
(NABARD 1992; 1996). These loans were ‘untied’ and the purpose for which it
wished to borrow was left to the group’s discretion. Whilst NABARD and RBI
encouraged banks to prioritise the SHG – bank linkage programme, their circulars
also emphasised that the scheme was not a targeted intervention having ‘quotas’
for disbursing loans to the general population or for marginalised sections.
In contrast, the SGSY uses SHGs as channels for delivering credit-cum-subsidy
assistance to households below the official poverty line. It carries sub-quotas for
people in the scheduled castes and tribes categories (50 per cent of bene-
ficiaries), women (40 per cent) and disabled people (3 per cent). As a self-
employment based poverty alleviation programme, the SGSY aims to bring every
assisted family above the poverty line within three years by helping them generate
a monthly income of at least Rs.2,000. Financing an individual or a collective
enterprise is therefore tied to the purpose of the loan and consumption spending
is not allowed. Loan size, in this case, does not depend on the amount a group
saves and is decided based on the project or proposed enterprise activity the
SHG selects. The loan includes a revolving fund of Rs.25,000 which helps to 
augment the group’s funds and develop its capacity to use funds from outside.
This is followed by the credit-cum-subsidy assistance for the enterprise activity.
The SHG’s suitability for receiving the money is assessed through appraisal 
interviews which are held in two stages and attended by representatives of the
BDO or DRDA, banks, Panchayats, NGOs and the SHGs (GOI 1999).6
3 The institutional context of SHG 
promotion
Several agencies including state and non-state institutions are a part of the micro-
finance landscape in India. These include NGOs, microfinance institutions, 
nationalised commercial banks, government departments/agencies and 
cooperatives (registered under various state laws). They help SHG formation, and
supervise, train and help them in maintaining their financial accounts (this is
referred to as ‘sponsoring’ or ‘promotion’ in the literature). 
While this paper deals primarily with the co-production relationship between
banks, the BDO and SHGs in the context of SHG financing,7 I provide below a
brief outline of the nature of co-production in SHG promotion in the state of Tamil
Nadu. 
In Tamil Nadu, the growth of SHGs the over the past decade, partly under the
aegis of the state-sponsored Bangaru Ammaiyar Ninaivu Mahalir Thittam scheme,
has given rise to contending claims between two main political parties about the
ownership of the SHG programme. 
Budget speeches delivered during AIADMK’s term (2001–2006) date the launch-
ing of the SHG scheme to 1992 when Jayalalitha was Chief Minister. For instance,
the Minister for Finance and Food, Ponnaiyan who was from AIADMK said in his
budget speech for 2004–2005, ‘The self help group movement, which was
launched by the Honourable Chief Minister Jayalalitha in 1992, has grown rapidly
and become a massive movement for the empowerment of women’ (GOTN 2004).
He re-asserted this in his speech the following year too, describing the SHG
movement as the Chief Minister’s ‘brain child’ (GOTN 2005).
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6 The SGSY was introduced in 1999 to replace the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) 
that came into existence in 1980 as the first nationwide attempt of Indian planners to incorporate credit
based self-employment generation within national poverty alleviation programmes. In the IRDP
scheme, banks extended credit-cum-subsidy to targeted poor households to finance the acquisition of 
income-earning assets that would enable them to cross the poverty line. The growth of the SHG 
phenomenon in the 1990s highlighted programme design flaws in the IRDP. The Reserve Bank of 
India’s Expert Committee on the IRDP noted that an important factor inhibiting its success was high 
transaction costs and recommended that self help groups be used in credit dispensation and in every 
stage of implementation of the IRDP (RBI n.d.). Eventually, it was decided to consolidate the multiple 
self-employment based poverty alleviation programmes into a single comprehensive scheme (the 
SGSY) based on a group approach. The scheme envisages a greater possibility of success with group
activities as it is easier to provide support services and marketing linkages. In addition to emphasising 
that SHG members adopt a single economic activity, the SGSY guidelines prescribe resources to be 
concentrated on developing a few key economic activities within an administrative block – the ‘cluster 
activity’ approach. (SGSY http: 3.19; 3.21).
7 Since this paper foregrounds the co-production relationship in SHG financing, there is a greater focus 
on banks and the BDO relative to NGOs which played a larger role in SHG promotion in the villages in
which this study was conducted. We note that NGOs sometimes also performed financial inter-
mediation by on-lending funds sourced from commercial banks or microfinance wholesalers to SHGs. 
However, in the villages in which this study was conducted, banks did not on-lend funds to SHGs 
through NGOs. 
In April 2006, the rival political party – DMK won the State Assembly elections.
SHGs in Tamil Nadu and their patronage was the crux of a controversy between
DMK and AIADMK during the election campaign. AIADMK claimed that DMK
would stop the SHG programme, should it return to power,8 while DMK chief
Karunanidhi vehemently denied this. Soon after the elections, the Governor (Head
of State) when addressing the State Assembly said, ‘The DMK government 
pioneered the formation of women’s self help groups in 1989 and has always
acted as a catalyst for their effective functioning’ (GOTN 2006).
Clearly, SHG-based microcredit is a development initiative that the two main 
political parties in Tamil Nadu – DMK and AIADMK – are equally eager to claim
credit for. This reflects the growing perception of SHGs as a pro-poor, pro-women
development agenda that no government can ignore. Such political claims are of
particular relevance to this paper, because they reflect the state’s investment in
SHG promotion in Tamil Nadu. The Mahalir Thittam scheme, a partnership
between the Tamil Nadu Women’s Development Corporation9 and NGOs, is the
main institutional arrangement for sponsoring SHGs in Tamil Nadu. The scheme
involves identifying and training state-wide networks of NGOs and providing 
financial and technical assistance from the Women’s Development Corporation.
NGO partners have the responsibility of forming, training and supervising SHGs.
While NGO-pioneered initiatives have been at the forefront of SHG formation in
several parts of the country, state-NGO partnerships have played a significant role
in expanding the scale and reach of the SHG phenomenon in the rural 
countryside.
In Tamil Nadu, NGO involvement in SHG promotion has been facilitated by official
encouragement by national agencies such as NABARD as well as by the 
organisational mandate of the Mahalir Thittam scheme to identify capable NGO
partners in the districts. It is estimated that 70 per cent of SHGs in Tamil Nadu
function within the ambit of the state-NGO partnership.10 The rest are outside this
partnership, mostly sponsored by NGOs and other agencies not associated with
the Mahalir Thittam scheme.11 From the inception of the SHG-bank linkage project
in 1992, NABARD pro-actively encouraged NGO participation in SHG promotion.
After introduction of the SGSY scheme, the state re-doubled its efforts to induce
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8 The Deccan Herald (2006).
9 The Tamil Nadu Corporation for Development of Women Limited is a Government of Tamil Nadu 
undertaking and was established in 1983 with the objectives of the socio-economic development and 
empowerment of women www.tamilnaduwomen.org/ 
10 Personal communication with an official of Tamil Nadu Women’s Development Corporation (April 
2004). There is no comprehensive state-wide data available on SHGs promoted by NGOs and other 
sponsoring agencies that are not partners of the Mahalir Thittam scheme. Any attempt to enumerate 
the total numbers of SHGs functioning in Tamil Nadu can therefore only be speculative.
11 NGOs may or may not choose to participate in the state-sponsored scheme for SHG promotion. 
Reasons for non-participation can also be ideological as some NGOs are uncomfortable with the 
agenda of the state and fear hijacking of the groups they sponsor by local bureaucracy. In such cases,
funding by donor agencies enables SHG promotion independent of the state’s initiatives. Ideological 
differences apart, several NGOs that wish to participate in Mahalir Thittam are unable to do so due to 
the limited number of partner NGOs that can be accommodated in the scheme.
the voluntary sector to engage in SHG promotion and to assist in reaching the 
targeted number of beneficiaries, monitoring utilisation of the loan-financed asset
and securing loan repayment.12 In addition to the tasks associated with SHG 
promotion, some NGOs (in Tamil Nadu and in other states) have also built 
secondary-level federations of village-level groups in order to help sustain SHGs
after the sponsoring NGO withdraws its support. Such SHG federations can take
on a wide range of functions that include training SHGs, capacity-building, trouble-
shooting and lobbying government (Fisher and Sriram 2002; NABARD 1999).
As in other states, bank institutions in Tamil Nadu sometimes act as sponsoring
agencies, in addition to their usual role of financing SHGs. The BDO too directly
undertakes SHG promotion. The Department of Rural Development and
Panchayati Raj in Tamil Nadu had earlier started SHGs formation through the
DRDA and the BDO, almost in competition with the Women’s Development
Corporation.13 But as field-level organisational mechanisms for supervision and
follow-up were absent, the BDO lost the momentum to promote SHGs indepen-
dently. The SHGs either collapsed or were taken over by NGOs that partnered
with the Women’s Development Corporation.14 However, in certain areas of Tamil
Nadu, SHGs directly promoted by the BDO continue to function.15
Evans (1996) argues that co-production relationships that generate ‘state-society’
synergy can be either based on a clear division of labour between government
and citizens (complementarity) or on ties and networks that cross the public–
private divide (embeddedness). The above account shows that the role of the
state in the co-production relationship extends beyond creating a policy environ
ment to facilitate SHG-banking or provide financial support for microenterprises
and income-generation activities. The state is engaged in SHG formation and 
promotion whether it is in partnership with NGOs or directly. The diversity of state
agencies involved in SHG promotion is also reflected in the field when SHGs 
identify themselves as ‘government groups’, ‘bank groups’ and ‘BDO groups’. 
The SHGs, reviewed for this paper, represent all types sponsored by different
agencies including a state-partner NGO, a non-partner NGO, the BDO and a
nationalised bank. Although there are differences between the SHG–bank linkage
and the SGSY schemes, SHGs and their members view both schemes as ways to
supplement the group’s corpus money that can be loaned. Hence it is important to
give an account of women’s struggles to secure loans through either scheme.16
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12 The SGSY prescribes an amount of Rs10,000 per group to be paid to the sponsoring organisation as 
incentive for forming a group, helping it to avail the SGSY loan from the bank and ensuring 
development of the SHG.
13 The Women’s Development Corporation was under the administrative control of Department of Social 
Welfare and Nutritious Meal Programme till mid-2006. From July 2006, it was brought under the 
control of the Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department.
14 Personal communication (April 2004) with an official of the Tamil Nadu Women’s Development 
Corporation.
15 SHG promotion is also a component of specific schemes / projects implemented by government 
departments such as the Department of Agriculture or the Department of Forests.
4 A Hobson’s choice
When sourcing bank loans through either scheme, SHGs invariably face the
bank’s tendency to make new loans contingent on group members’ repaying any
unpaid overdues from earlier loans they may have taken as individuals. These
loans may have been borrowed either directly by the SHG member or, as was
more commonly the case in this study, by their male relatives (husband, son or
sometimes brothers-in-law). One tedious procedure for SHGs availing bank loans
is obtaining a ‘no-objection’ certificate from all banks in the vicinity. This certificate
has to declare that no member or her relative had any outstanding loan to the
banks. The local banks from which SHGs seek loans are also those that were
responsible for implementing earlier credit-based anti-poverty programmes. SHGs
therefore are forced to contend with the legacy of this history.17
Swarna’s18 (an SHG member) case illustrates the loan recovery pressures banks
put on SHGs. Swarna’s husband had borrowed Rs.2,500, 16 years ago from the
cooperative society to buy goats. This had grown to Rs.10,650 with the interest
over the years, when the SHG she was a member of, was sanctioned a bank
loan. Swarna claimed that her husband stopped repaying his loan when he learnt
that the then state government had waived the loan. Swarna, accompanied by the
20 members of her SHG, went to the bank to persuade the manager not to make
the current SHG loan contingent on repayment of the old loan. However, an
unyielding manager said to Swarna, ‘When your husband took this loan, would
you have said no? Like that, you have a role in repayment too’ (meaning: you are
liable too as you would certainly have not discouraged your husband from taking
the loan). The NGO sponsoring the SHG supported the manager’s position and
asked Swarna to repay the loan. Luckily, Swarna’s daughter-in-law received a
lump sum of money from the shoe company where she had worked for several
years, which Swarna could use. She repaid Rs.6,500 and informed the bank 
manager that she could pay no more. 
Swarna was relatively fortunate as she managed to retain her SHG membership
unlike several others. Saradamma, an elderly widow, quit the group when she
was unable to repay her deceased husband’s overdues to the bank. It is 
important to note that bank strategies to compel individual members to repay old
loans included the threat of stopping all new loans to SHGs unless such members
were expelled. 
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16 This account does not attempt to document or quantitatively assess the routine costs incurred by 
SHGs when accessing bank loans, such as number of visits to banks, travel costs, paper work, time 
taken to process and disburse loans or daily wages foregone. A study of the SHG-bank linkage 
scheme in the state of Andhra Pradesh has quantified these costs for a sample of 400 SHGs (Reddy 
2005).
17 Poor repayment of loans in older schemes such as the IRDP may be attributed to the poor institutional
incentives for repayment including the tendency of political leaders to announce loan write-offs during 
elections and inattention to repayment criteria and asset-productivity when selecting enterprise 
activities (Kabeer and Murthy 1996: 2.3).
18 All names in this paper have been changed.
SHGs consequently face the difficult choice of ensuring full repayment of all old
bank loans by members and their relatives or having to expel these members.
Sometimes SHG members become the targets of bank pressures even if they (or
their spouses) have not directly borrowed and are merely co-guarantors for friends
or relatives. Kasturi, who was co-guarantor to her brother’s loan for a 
bullock cart, was expelled from the SHG on the bank’s orders. After making her
brother repay the balance he owed the bank Kasturi re-joined her group. 
Lakshmi quit her group with much bitterness because of a loan borrowed by her
husband’s brother. She argued that her husband had not signed his brother’s loan
document as co-signatory, but the bank maintained that the loan was nevertheless
sanctioned on her husband’s assurance that his brother would repay. Sometimes
women lose SHG membership despite efforts to repay at least a part of old bank
loans. Panchalai, who had been gradually repaying her son’s bank loan of
Rs.10,000 with internal loans from the SHG, had no option but to quit the group
when the bank manager insisted that she repay the balance of Rs.5,000 as soon
as the SHG’s bank loan was sanctioned. 
This practice of recovering long overdue loans has generated a trend of ‘bank-
induced dropouts’. Research which seeks to understand the various ‘push’ factors
such as household stress, repayment pressures, migration, etc. that drive women
out of microcredit programmes, should also factor in these loan recovery 
pressures from banks. In some cases, the pressure to exclude certain women is
exerted at the time of SHG formation, much before any loans are sought. As soon
as new SHGs open savings bank accounts it gives banks the power to determine
which ones they would allow and which they would not. It is not uncommon for
banks to use this opportunity to stipulate that groups should deny membership to
women who had relatives who had not repaid old loans. Women also tend to
exclude themselves from SHGs, anticipating such problems. 
Such pressures however, are not officially sanctioned. With respect to SGSY
loans to defaulters of older bank loans, RBI’s master circular on the SGSY makes
a distinction between ‘wilful’ and ‘non-wilful’ defaulters. Wilful defaulters are not
permitted benefits under the SGSY scheme until the older loan is cleared but they
may be allowed to participate in the normal savings and credit activities of the
SHG. The group may be financed under the SGSY scheme, by excluding wilful
defaulters, as non-wilful defaulters are allowed to access the loan (RBI 2005).
Similarly, the operational features of the direct linkage scheme clarify that a few
SHG members or their family having unpaid loans to the bank is not a problem if
the SHG itself is not a defaulter. The new bank loan, however, may not be given
to a defaulting member (NABARD 1996). 
Such pressures from banks result not only in drop-outs but also in provoking 
conflicts which jeopardise group solidarity and cohesion. They also create 
tensions within and between families as women pressurise relatives and friends to
repay their loans. As in the case of Swarna, SHG women occasionally resist
bank’s pressures. They argue for their creditworthiness to be ascertained 
independently based on their performance in the SHG. However, banks disregard
this and continue to use women’s gendered household identities for the 
instrumental purpose of loan recovery in ways that are detrimental to groups and
individual members. This strategy is not opposed greatly by government 
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bureaucracies, NGOs or households of SHG members, because banks are able
to draw on a shared understanding that women were responsible for repaying
their husband’s loans.19 
SHGs’, and in particular their coordinators’, perceptions of such bank practices as
fair or otherwise sets apart groups that are able to stand their ground and protect
members’ interests from those that choose to comply with the banks’ demands.
For example, an assertive SHG coordinator defended her group’s right to share
the bank loan with members who had unpaid individual loans, despite the bank’s
instructions that the women be expelled. In the same village, however, coordinator
Kaniyamma of another SHG was keen to ensure that women repaid their old
loans to the bank. Kaniyamma said, ‘Making the women repay the bank is our
achievement’. 
The strategies SHGs use to secure loans when they face such pressures are
reviewed here. SHGs often resort to different methods to deceive the bank, such
as producing a formal letter declaring that the specified women have quit the
group, although in reality they continue as members. This needs intra-group unity
and willingness from everyone in the group to take the risk, in order to protect the
interests of a few members. An SHG coordinator, once asked by a bank manager
for the names of fathers-in-law of all SHG members, provided false names 
foreseeing that the enquiries pertained to outstanding bank loans. 
Banks and SHGs sometimes also collude to conceal the presence of defaulters,
such as not letting other banks know of them when obtaining the ‘no-objection’
certificate. For example, when an SHG president Ruku was forced by one of the
five banks in her area to repay a large amount of her husband’s loan (Rs.11,000),
she pleaded with the SHG’s financing bank and stressed that her efforts had built
the group. The financing bank which was also the sponsoring agency in this case,
had a close relationship with the groups it promoted. The bank manager then 
suggested that the SHG give a written declaration that Ruku had been expelled
by the group. Ruku had to relinquish her leadership position but remained a 
member of the group. Whether the manager would have empathised as much
with Ruku if the debt had been owed to his bank instead is, of course, doubtful.
Another strategy, also frequently used to secure loans, is for SHGs to mobilise
financial resources to lend to individual women for repaying old bank loans. In one
case, an SHG paid Rs.45,000 to the bank (to repay old loans of eight members),
half of which was raised through internal or group-generated loans. SHGs also
become ‘debt collectors’ who undertake repayment campaigns in their village or
Panchayat on behalf of the bank. This is particularly true when banks make loans
to SHGs conditional on repayments from villagers who have no relationship to
SHG members. For example, an SHG ‘earned’ its loan by persuading five families
of non-members to repay a sum of Rs.25,000. They subsequently challenged the
bank manager to grant them the loan saying, ‘Even if Rs.5,000 was paid to the
bank because of our efforts, you would be obliged to give us our loan. Now, you
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19 As Kabeer (1999) argues, ideologies of gender inequality can cut across institutional sites and the 
practices of institutions can be a key factor in the reproduction of gender inequalities.
have got Rs.25,000 because of our group. We have kept our promise. You keep
yours and give us our loan.’
The efforts SHG coordinators put in are crucial for settling bank debts – a fact
banks are well aware of. When Mallika, a SHG coordinator, ensured that all her
group members repaid their old bank loans, the bank manager jocularly asked her
to recover overdues from non-members too. She replied saying, ‘You earn a
salary. Will you pay me for this work?’ Although Mallika’s response was made in
jest, the issue she raises is serious and central to banks manipulating SHGs’
community-level social networks and SHG coordinators striving to settle debts.
This injustice stands out starkly when we see that SHGs have become popular
within the commercial banking structure primarily because banks have been able
to transfer screening and loan recovery responsibilities, and other transaction
costs to the poor people themselves. When all these strategies fail, SHGs 
succumb to the bank’s pressures and force individual members to drop-out. 
5 Valued customers or potential 
defaulters?
The spectre of old bank loans haunts SHGs in other ways as well. There are
instances where banks have demanded three-year fixed deposits amounting to 
25 per cent to 30 per cent of the loan as collateral, prior to sanctioning the SGSY
loan. This contradicts SGSY rules which explicitly forbid banks from demanding
any collateral. However, some banks see SHGs as potential defaulters and 
credit-risks. In one village, the bank demanded fixed deposits from Rs.30,000 to
Rs.60,000 for loans ranging in value from Rs.100,000 to Rs.200,000. This was
because of the bank’s scepticism about repayments on the SGSY loans based on
their past experiences (with the Integrated Rural Development Programme loans).
SHG women had to pledge their jewellery and seek informal loans from money-
lenders, family and friends to raise their share of the fixed deposit (Rs.1,500 to
Rs.3,000 each). Although individual SHGs protested and demanded that the bank
should trust the women ‘since they were SHG members after all’, there was no
collective or coordinated village-level action from all groups together. As the SGSY
loans were sanctioned to different SHGs at different times, when the first group
paid for the fixed deposit it forced the succeeding ones to do so too. When one
group which paid collateral of Rs.60,000 to the bank, applied for a second SGSY
loan, officials of the BDO came to know of it. However, they were entirely un-
helpful. They expressed anger and displeasure, and did not see the reason for an
SHG to apply for another loan when it already had a large fixed deposit in the
bank. They wanted the SHG to immediately report the matter to the District
Collector. The SHG coordinators however wanted to avoid further trouble and did
not pursue the matter further. SHG women are fully aware that they lose out on
the interest rates too (the interest paid by the bank on the fixed deposit is 8 per
cent per annum while the interest paid on SGSY loans, as estimated by the
women, was upwards of 12 per cent per annum). 
In summary, a bank’s non-negotiable demand for collateral payment makes the
SHG women disempowered partners in an unequal transaction. 
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6 Group loans and bank loans: 
a case of undue diligence?
Although SHGs demand that their credit history should be the only criteria for loan
sanction, sometimes they find that if a bank focuses too much on their internal
repayment record, it could have negative consequences. As banks routinely check
account books to assess an SHG’s creditworthiness, they are capable of refusing
loans to a group if even one of its members has defaulted or made late payments
on group-sourced loans. SHGs are particularly susceptible to this when seeking
the direct linkage (non-subsidy) loan because banks are not under the pressure to
meet disbursal targets for this loan category. Although SHGs sometimes attempt
to convince banks about their situation (i.e. irregular repayments due to poverty
and uncertain livelihoods), they usually resort to fudging account books prior to
the bank supervision to reflect timely repayments. Sponsoring NGOs too assist
SHGs in covering up repayment irregularities in the account books. 
My interviews with NGOs reveal that SHGs comprising Dalit women’s or other
socially marginalised communities are more disadvantaged, in terms of securing
banks loans, especially direct linkage loans. These are poorer groups, often 
landless and hence erratic repayments on internal loans are sometimes more 
frequent. I interviewed a Dalit woman heading an NGO, who reported that the
bank manager frequently criticised her publicly in his office saying, ‘Your people
are always like this. They don’t repay on time.’ She said to me, ‘I find this 
humiliating since I know he is referring to my caste.’ The caste-based responses
that sometimes mark SHG-bank relationships clearly reflect the insensitivity of
banks to the social and economic context in which different SHGs operate. 
In one of the study villages, this caste discrimination in accessing loans could be
plainly seen. The direct linkage loans were more easily secured by SHGs which
had members from the backward castes rather than those which had members
from the Scheduled Castes.20 The bank had declined loans to five Scheduled
Caste groups and blamed it on their irregular repayments of internal, group-
sourced loans. Five other SHGs with members of  backward castes were given
Rs.200,000 per SHG (for Rs.10,000 each to be distributed to 20 members). Only
one SHG with Scheduled Caste members, persisted with its demands until the
manager could no longer deny them a loan. However, they secured a smaller loan
of Rs.150,000. Later, the bank had to give loans under a state government 
sponsored house upgradation scheme which was targeted to only women 
members of SHGs who lived in thatched huts. Some members of the SC SHGs
which were denied the direct linkage loan received the house upgradation loan as
they qualified for it. And to pre-empt any conflict within SHGs on account of this
IDS WORKING PAPER 303
18
20 The government categorises caste groups as Backward classes (BCs), Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes in increasing order of social oppression and deprivation. The term ‘backward castes’
as I use it refers to SHG members belonging to the government classified ‘backward classes’ who 
rank higher on the caste hierarchy than the Scheduled Castes or Dalits. The two groups (SCs and 
BCs) usually live in segregated fashion in separate hamlets in rural Tamil Nadu. So much so, most 
SHGs have exclusive members of SCs or BCs.
selective disbursal, the bank decided to grant the direct linkage loan to members
of SC SHGs who were ineligible to access the house upgradation loan. An SHG
coordinator recalls the bank manager justifying this by announcing that the house
upgradation loan was for SHG women who lived in thatched huts and the linkage
loan for those who lived in tiled or two-storeyed homes. Moreover, these loans
were given under the aegis of a new bank manager. The coordinator of an SC
SHG commented, ‘The former manager was too strict in judging our repayment
record. But the new man has a conscience and is more humane. He understands
our poverty.’ In contrast, the backward caste SHGs were grateful to the earlier
manager who was generous with them. This shows how SHGs with Scheduled
Caste members  were discriminated against in the distribution of the direct linkage
loans in this case.21
SHG women sometimes protest against the perceived injustice of bank 
procedures. A Dalit women’s group once challenged the bank: ‘We have no work
now. So we haven’t repaid our loans. It is our savings money that we haven’t
repaid. Why do you enquire about that? It’s not your business. You have a right to
question us if we don’t repay your loans.’ This interesting exchange suggests that
what banks see as a routine procedure for assessing creditworthiness and 
evaluating risk could be interpreted by SHGs as unnecessary interference in their
internal affairs.
7 Servicing bank loans: bending 
over backwards
In the study villages, it was clear that bankers’ misgivings about the non-
repayment of bank loans by SHGs were entirely unfounded. All the SHGs in 
villages included in my study had a very good repayment record on direct linkage
and SGSY loans. This has been maintained due to strict disciplinary pressures
from SHG coordinators and intra-SHG peer dynamics. In places where banks
were openly sceptical about the SHG’s willingness or ability to repay, women
made efforts to demonstrate their repayment ability, sometimes at a considerable
cost to themselves. Although the recommended repayment period for the SGSY
loan was three years, actual repayment was in many cases completed well before
the deadline and sometimes in less than half the period.22
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21 A large-scale quantitative study assessing performance of the SHG-bank linkage scheme across 400 
SHGs in 8 districts of Andhra Pradesh also found poorer linkage of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes groups in comparison to Open Category SHGs. Among others, the study finds that only 5 per 
cent of Scheduled Castes SHGs received a total amount of loans beyond Rs.105,000 and no 
Scheduled Tribes SHGs received such loans. In contrast, 22 per cent of Open Category groups 
received loans beyond Rs.1.05 lakhs. The average current loan size was highest among Open 
Category SHG at Rs.44,585, and lowest was among Scheduled Tribes at Rs.27,059 (Reddy 2005).
22 All SGSY loans are treated as medium term loans with minimum repayment period of five years. As 
per the norms of the SGSY, beneficiaries are not entitled to the subsidy if the loan is fully repaid 
before a certain fixed ‘lock-in’ period (SGSY http 2001). Even if SHGs completed repayment in a short
period, the loan account was formally closed by the bank and the subsidy returned to the group only 
at the end of three years. 
One SHG attempted to complete full repayment of the SGSY loan (a total sum of
Rs.100,000, where each member received Rs.5,000) in 10 months by setting a
high monthly instalment (Rs.500 per member). The SHG chose to do this, to
ensure disciplined repayments so that they could apply for the next loan of
Rs.200,000. The possibility of getting a larger loan is a good incentive for SHGs to
keep up their repayments. Besides, the bank is a highly valued external contact,
which SHGs do not want to antagonise. For example, in all the SHGs in the study
villages, women had not completely repaid internal (group-generated) loans when
the bank loans were disbursed. Women then prioritised timely repayment of bank
loans over internal loans. 
SHG coordinators, who fear annoying banks, resort to precautionary measures
within the group to emphasise the urgency for repaying and avoid default. In one
instance the President and Secretary of an SHG, supported by NGO staff, lied to
other members that the bank had taken their property documents (for their
homes) which could be forfeited, if SHG members failed to repay the SGSY loan.
Coordinators of two other SHGs insisted that each member should sign an official
loan agreement form and have her husband and two other members as co-
signatories. Although women were unhappy about costs and their husbands being
involved, the coordinators were firm. An SHG President asked, ‘What happens if a
woman dies and her husband disowns responsibility for the loan? The bank will
hound me (meaning: I would be held responsible for the repayment).’
Some SHGs allow each borrower to decide her own repayment schedule for 
internal loans based on her ability to repay. However, this flexibility is invariably
absent for repayments of the external bank loans. Punitive measures, including
fines, are usually enforced to ensure their timely repayments. For example, one
SHG charged its members a fine of Rs.25 for every day the monthly repayment
was delayed. One SHG coordinator felt that ‘delaying repayment on a bank loan
was simply not an option no matter what the personal circumstances were.’
Although banks are responsible to some extent in creating the fear about loan
repayments, bank personnel are not always aware of the actual pressures exerted
within the group. One of the SHGs, in my study, charged one of its members (a
poor vegetable vendor) a total fine of Rs.550 (at the rate of Rs.50 per day) for
delaying repayment of the bank loan. This was despite the fact that emergency
throat surgery for her son had caused the delay. She reportedly broke down at the
SHG meeting when she paid the fine. The SHG’s Secretary (who said that the
President and other members were responsible for the undue pressure), threat-
ened to report the matter to the bank and warned others that they could go to jail
for harassing a co-member. Similarly members of a different SHG in the same 
village verbally abused a co-member for not paying a month’s instalment. This
woman had been recently widowed and had the responsibility of bringing up two
small children. The SHG’s President regretfully admitted that group members
sometimes showed less sympathy than banks.
Banks and the BDO too have their strategies to ensure timely repayments. In one
study village, BDO officials warned women that they would cancel the subsidy
component unless instalments were paid to the bank before the 10th every month.
Although SHG coordinators did not think that the BDO would actually do that, they
admitted that it worried women. In another case, the bank instructed SHGs not to
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sanction internal loans, unless all bank loans were fully repaid. Through this the
bank wanted to eliminate competition and have complete control over repay-
ments. Group members resented the condition as it deprived them of their access
to emergency loans as a result. This pressure was exerted selectively in the 
village on SHGs with Scheduled Caste members, which yet again, reflects the
banks’ subjective assessment of the SHGs’ credit-worthiness. As banks are 
financiers as well as bankers for SHGs, they are able to transfer money from the
SHG’s regular savings account to the bank loan account when repayments are
delayed.23 And some banks do use this dual role to their advantage. 
With most of the groups that I interviewed, bank loans came with punitive repay-
ment conditions and tensions that were less pronounced with internal, group-
sourced loan repayments. The degree to which SHGs enforced repayment 
discipline on internal loans varied from one group to the other. However, all SHGs
were far less sympathetic about delayed repayments on bank loans than internal
loans. Loan transactions which involve other institutional actors such as the BDO
or the bank therefore seem to be marked by qualitatively different repayment
dynamics. 
8 Fractured trust
Although the relationship presents several opportunities for SHGs and banks to
understand each others’ constraints and perspectives, mutual trust is largely
absent. This is the result of the legacy of mistrust owing to earlier experience of
credit-based anti-poverty programmes and of poor communication from banks
about the terms of repayment of subsidy-bearing bank loans (the SGSY loan).
While banks suspect women’s intentions about loan repayment, SHGs resent 
paying an interest on the bank loans which they perceive as a drain on their
resources. This was because the banks, in my study, did not take women into
confidence when calculating the interest rates on SGSY loans. Women thus felt
that the interest was arbitrarily determined by the bank. This was a contentious
issue and soured the SHG-bank relationship.
The guidelines of the SGSY scheme state that the interest rate on loans will be as
notified by the Reserve Bank of India and NABARD from time to time. As per RBI
guidelines, interest rates on ‘priority sector’ lending (which include loans to SHGs
under the direct linkage and SGSY schemes) should not exceed the prime lending
rate (PLR) of the bank for loans upto Rs.200,000 (RBI http 1).24 The prime 
lending rate varied between annual rates of 10 and 12.5 per cent 25 for the period
that the SGSY loans were taken by the groups in this study (RBI http 2).26
Most SHGs remained uncertain about the actual rate of interest payable since
banks did not state upfront what the rate of interest was nor did they provide the
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23 Most SHGs had separate bank accounts for the SGSY loan and for their regular internal loans.
24 Banks are free to determine the interest rate for ‘priority sector’ loans above this amount.
25 The Reserve Bank of India provides data on the prime lending rate of 5 major banks (RBI http 2).
groups loan documents clarifying the terms of repayment with regard to duration
or the rate of interest charged. Yet another confusion with regard to the basis of
calculation of interest by banks had to do with whether banks charged interest on
a declining balance basis i.e., whether interest increased with time taken to repay
the loan or it remained fixed, irrespective of repayment duration. SHG member
Vani insisted that the bank would charge the same interest whether the loan was
repaid in one year or in three and attributed her SHG’s frenetic pace of loan
repayment to her co-members’ inability to understand this. Chitra of another SHG
in the same village endorsed her group’s decision to complete loan repayment in
18 months, thereby escaping ‘even double the interest amount’ that the bank may
have charged if the duration were longer. While banks did charge diminishing
interest, such contradictory opinions were common owing to the lack of clarity
regarding the method of interest calculation. 
I present an SHG’s experience to further illustrate the point about poor communi-
cation between banks and SHGs. The three year duration of the Revolving Fund
component of the SGSY loan for this SHG ended in December 2003. Later in
March 2004, the bank demanded the SHG to pay Rs.3,600 as interest and in
August 2004 it asked for Rs.1,950 towards insurance. The women, however, had
already paid an interest with monthly repayments which made them suspicious of
further payments towards interest. Parameswari, the SHG’s Secretary asked the
bank manager, ‘Can you feed oil tomorrow to a child that died today, and make it
come alive?”.27 Her question was an attempt to seek a dialogue regarding bank
procedures by drawing a parallel to the conceptual universe familiar to her. The
bank manager however was angered with this and retorted, ‘What a country
bumpkin you are! Village women can understand nothing. If you don’t shut up, I
will get even more abusive.’
SHGs often receive no assistance to understand the categories banks use when
charging loan servicing fees. In the above case, the demand for insurance further
surprised the SHG as they had not bought any livestock which alone, in their 
perception, could incur insurance costs. Parameswari felt that the bank’s practice
of demanding payment for unexplained reasons caused group members to 
suspect coordinators of siphoning away the SHG’s finances. 
SHG coordinators’ attempts to understand the basis of interest calculations often
turns out to be futile and exasperating for the women. Banks tend not to explain
and SHGs perceive this withholding of information as harassment and extortion.
26 On the grounds that the priority sector consists of poverty alleviation schemes (such as the SGSY) as 
well as schemes not targeted to the poor below the poverty line, bureaucrats of the rural development 
department have argued that a separate lending rate for all poverty alleviation schemes of the Ministry
of Rural Development be introduced (DRDA http). The Ministry of Rural Development has also 
impressed upon the Reserve Bank of India and NABARD the need to ensure that bank loans to SHGs
under the SGSY scheme are made available within a slab of 4 to 6 per cent annual rates (The Hindu 
Business Line 2004). However, the Ministry has not mandated this. 
27 This reference is to a practice in rural Tamil Nadu of placing a few drops of cooking oil in the mouth of 
a dead person. The belief is that this will preserve the body for a longer period. In this context, 
Parameswari means that since loan repayment is over, it cannot be revived by feeding it interest at a 
later date.
IDS WORKING PAPER 303
22
For example, an SHG, which repaid the entire SGSY loan (Rs.100,000) in 18
months, paid a total interest of Rs.3,700 on the manager’s instructions. Later, a
new bank manager said that the interest was not paid completely and demanded
an additional Rs.4,000. When the SHG President said that the women believed
that interest payment was complete and would not pay further, the manager did
not clear the confusion by explaining how the interest was determined. Instead he
remarked, ‘What can I do? The computer says you must pay more. Bring your
women to the bank. Let them see the computer.’
Some of these issues cannot be necessarily limited to deliberate attempts at 
withholding information or an absence of transparency. They also underscore the
need for building SHGs and group coordinators’ capacity to understand bank 
procedures. Empowering SHGs to seek and gain vital information regarding the
terms of a loan is a process that requires substantial time and resource 
commitment from the sponsoring agency. Banks too have to proactively work at
demystifying procedures. As this is absent, SHG women feel exploited and 
vulnerable to individual bank officers’ whims. 
9 Good manager, bad manager
Securing loans usually entails frequent visits to the bank. SHGs and their coordi-
nators in particular, find this prospect unwelcome. Sometimes routine weekly visits
to the bank to deposit cash become unpleasant, as bank officers are intolerant of
rural women who usually have low literacy levels. Banks reprimand SHGs for
sending the same women (usually the President and Secretary) to the bank and
demand that others show up in turns, but when they do, bank officers are 
impatient with women who take time to understand procedures.28
A bank manager asked an SHG President to return with a fresh cheque as the
one she brought had an ink stain. She came away distressed as she was unable
to muster the courage to tell him that her young child had accidentally tipped ink
all over the cheque book. In another case, an SHG’s coordinators refused to
accept a sum of Rs.2,500 as Re 1 denomination coins because their members
would not be able to keep track of small change or even store it safely. The
branch manager was enraged at their refusal and could not be placated even
when they later offered to accept the coins. The manager replied, ‘If you ever
make a mistake in bank procedure in future, see how I treat you’ (meaning: I will
be nasty if you make any minor errors in form-filling etc’).
Although some bank managers and staff are civil to SHG women, they do not
completely understand the opportunity costs for women to visit banks. This lack of
sympathy for the lost time and wages is frustrating for SHGs. One SHG 
coordinator remembered being sent back with her money on three different 
28 An early NABARD-sponsored evaluation of the SHG-bank linkage programme showed the tendency of
bank officials to be patronising and disrespectful to SHG customers. Harper (2002b) cautioned that 
bank officials’ attitudes to SHGs could threaten the social empowerment dimensions of SHG 
programmes.
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occasions as bank staff were too busy to accept her deposit. An SHG member
commented, ‘Bank officers just don’t realise how much work women have to do at
home.’
SHGs with poorer Scheduled Caste members resisted the strict directive from
banks that all SHG members should take turns for weekly deposit and with-
drawing cash. A larger number of Scheduled Caste members (as compared to
members from other castes) were wage labourers in shoe manufacturing 
companies. These companies penalised workers who missed one day of work by
not giving them work for four successive days. When the SHG president pointed
this out to the bank manager, he sarcastically suggested that she should expel all
wage labourers from her group and retain only women who stayed at home. 
It is clear that while SHG-banking is certainly banking with poor women, it is not
necessarily pro-poor or gender-sensitive banking. Women largely perceive banks
as insensitive to their needs and circumstances and impatient with their lack of
prior experience. 
Because the bank as an institution is not good with accommodating the needs of
SHGs, individuals in these institutions and their particular behaviour assumed a
great significance for the SHGs. In my field study, I heard several narratives of
‘the good manager’ and the ‘bad manager’. If a ‘good manager’ was transferred it
was a great loss for the SHGs. They usually awaited the new manager, an
unknown person, with much anxiety. One SHG coordinator said the bank manager
who disbursed the Revolving Fund loan was ‘rude and sharp tongued’, while his
successor, who sanctioned the SGSY enterprise loan was ‘patient with women
like us’. And as she put it, ‘Otherwise we have to salaam 10 times to get someone
to notice us.’29 On another occasion SHGs organised a farewell party for a ‘good’
bank manager who was transferred from their area. This was a lavish ceremony
where they presented gold jewellery to the manager and made speeches about
his ‘good deeds’. It is therefore not uncommon for SHGs to invest considerable
resources to build and maintain cordial relationships with their bank manager. 
10 Fitting policy to reality: costs of
subversion
The BDO, as described earlier, administrates subsidy-bearing schemes such as
the SGSY and the funds from Central and State governments are routed through
the DRDA. An SHG’s costs of securing SGSY loans are inflated due to bribes to
the government bureaucracy for approving and processing the subsidy 
component of the loan. However as I show below, this is not the only or most 
significant cost that SHGs incur. 
The SHGs that I interviewed asserted unequivocally that collectively-managed
group enterprises held no prospect for the SHG’s advancement and that, in fact,
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29 In this context, to salaam is to greet someone in supplicant fashion.
they were risky. If enterprises failed, not only would the SHG collapse but the
accumulated savings of the women would be also lost. The failure of the 
monsoons for about four years prior to the period of study resulted in the 
considerable scaling down of agricultural activity and of wage labour opportunities
in agriculture.30 The ensuing situation of ‘no rains, no work’ threw a number of
existing small businesses and activities such as brick kilns (which depended on
water) into crisis. In such a context, SHG women treat the prospect of initiating
new enterprises with scepticism.
However, the SGSY scheme is much sought after because the subsidy 
component of the loan (close to a third to half of loan value) is attractive. This
induces women to invest considerable energy and resources to make the scheme
work for them by subverting it. Several SHGs distribute the amount (loan and 
subsidy) equally amongst all members for them to use it for household needs
rather than setting up enterprises (similar to internal loans). NGOs functioning in
various parts of Tamil Nadu report a widespread subversion of the official purpose
of the SGSY scheme.31 My field study in three villages provided an opportunity to
understand the ways in which the subversion takes place.
One SHG proposed to build evidence about managing a brick kiln business with
the SGSY loan. They contacted a brick kiln operator in the neighbourhood and
struck a deal with him. The owner provided documents to the effect that the SHG
had acquired a brick kiln and leased it him to manage. The documents declared
that he had received Rs.100,000 (the loan amount sanctioned to the SHG) for a
truckload of coal for the kiln and for procuring clay, mud and water. The SHG paid
him Rs.4,000 for providing fictitious documents. Bank staff visited the brick kiln
three times for verification and photo documentation. The SHG’s secretary said
‘Of course the bank knew we were not managing an enterprise!’. It is clear that
SHGs create and sustain non-existent enterprises with the full knowledge of the
sponsoring NGOs, the loan-giving banks and the subsidy providing BDO.32 This
collusion becomes necessary since bank officials and the BDO have to ensure
that an annual ‘quota’ of loans allocated under the SGSY scheme are disbursed
through SHGs to women who are neither willing nor able to engage in loan-
financed income generation.
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30 This failure of monsoons and the crisis of agriculture-dependent livelihoods were experienced in many
parts of rural Tamil Nadu during this period.
31 The incentives for borrowers to subvert the official borrowing purpose can be further understood from 
research literature which critiques the conceptualisation and implementation of self-employment 
promotion schemes including the SGSY and its predecessor, the IRDP. In brief, the IRDP was 
inadequate in bridging gaps between products produced by poor people and the availability of local 
markets for these. The rural development bureaucracy was also unsuited for planning and selecting 
viable enterprises. It had an underlying assumption that poor people are a homogenous mass with 
uniform endowments and capacities for entrepreneurial advancement (GOI 1985; Bagchee 1987; 
Pulley 1989). Some of the core issues raised by researchers with regard to the IRDP are not 
adequately addressed by the SGSY (Kalpana 2005). Although the guidelines of the SGSY envisage 
an elaborate process of planning at local levels prior to the selection of enterprises (with regard to 
availability of infrastructure, markets, and the capacities of beneficiaries) assessments of the SGSY
indicate that comprehensive planning at the block and district levels remains as unreal in the SGSY as
it was with the IRDP (Banerjee and Sen 2003; Nair and Mathew 2000; Reddy 2000). 
Fabricating evidence entails high costs to SHGs as it involves pay-offs to owners
of various locally-based small-scale businesses. As one SHG coordinator said,
‘Nowadays, owners of coconut groves, brick kilns, shoe companies, tailoring
shops and poultry farms have woken up to the possibility of doing deals with SHG
women as the latter run around and beg for their documents in order to get bank
loans.’
Identifying a willing enterprise owner is sometimes exceedingly difficult since the
owners fear that the bank may seize their enterprise if the SHG defaults on the
loan repayment. (The only collateral the rules of the SGSY scheme formally allow
is assets generated from the economic activity the bank finances.) Some enter-
prise owners fear that the SHG might claim ownership of the enterprise because it
possesses legal documents about the purchase of the business through the
SGSY loan. Whilst business operators are the de facto owners, SHGs become
the de jure owners. Such fears are reflected in the large payments SHGs 
sometimes make to compensate business owners for their perceived risks in
transfering ownership documents to SHGs. For example, an SHG which wanted
to build evidence of running a tailoring unit succeeded in finding a willing 
businessman only after searching for two months and agreeing to pay him
Rs.9,000. 
The process of fabricating evidence is not entirely risk-free either. The experience
of two SHGs that were sanctioned loans of Rs.150,000 each, to set up cement
stone manufacturing units, is exemplary of the efforts women undertake when the
arrangements of fabricating evidence goes wrong. All the efforts these SHGs
undertook reflect both the persistence of the groups and the appeal of the 
subsidised loan.
After disbursing the loan amount, the bank manager said the balance (subsidy
component) would be released conditional on the SHGs’ purchase of cement and
other equipment and when they actually start the enterprise. The SHGs were
taken aback since they had planned to show some falsified evidence of 
possession of land and subsequently distribute the loans among all members. The
SHGs, in this case, were in a problem as there were no cement stone manu-
facturers near their village, which could be passed off as their own. The groups
had initially chosen brick kiln management as their proposed enterprise as brick-
making activity was common in the village. But, senior bank and government 
officials intervened to change this to ‘cement stone manufacture’ as the groups
had scored highly in the grading exercise and ‘deserved’ to be financed for a 
higher-order enterprise. The SHGs’ problem was further confounded as the new
bank manager insisted on substantive proof of activity and was less flexible and
understanding than his predecessor.
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32 As described earlier (in footnote 6), the choice of enterprise in the SGSY scheme is narrowed down to
a few pre-selected activities. All enterprises mentioned in this Section (such as the brick kiln) were 
selected by SHGs from the official list of income-generation activities that was approved by banks and
the district development agency. SHGs, which were well-informed about the range of activities that 
they could choose from, usually selected one, for which proof of existence could be easily shown.
SHG coordinators visited the bank and the BDO several times to resolve the crisis
but faced with a stubborn manager, they asked the Panchayat president to 
mediate. This was a rare occurrence in the study villages. Institutional actors who
normally get involved in the process include the bank, the BDO and the 
sponsoring NGOs. The intervention of Panchayat representatives is never 
considered necessary. When the Panchayat president’s endeavours too failed, an
SHG coordinator tried to exert political pressure on the bank manager using her
influence as a member of the AIADMK. Both SHGs discussed the possibility of
approaching the AIADMK candidate for the April 2006 Tamil Nadu Assembly 
elections to promise him 40 votes if he could secure their loan. They also 
contacted other banks in the neighbouring town to explore the possibility of 
moving their accounts to another bank, where the manager would perhaps be
more accommodating. The SHG’s coordinators attempted to take the matter to the
District Collector too, but returned after spending a day at his office waiting for an
audience with him. 
Eventually the SHGs gave up when the manager threatened to report them to the
police if they continued to hassle him about the loan. The secretary of one of the
groups pointed out that her SHG had spent Rs.11,000 on visits to the BDO and
the bank, phone calls, bribes and other expenses for a loan that did not 
materialise. Commenting on the difficulties and the financial loss they had 
undergone, the SHGs’ coordinators claimed they would never apply for a bank
loan again. 
SHGs which employ such methods that eventually fail carry a risk of being
severely demoralised to the extent that routine group-level transactions, including
conducting weekly meetings and savings and credit transactions, are adversely
affected. Although the two SHGs referred to here failed to secure the loan, eight
other SHGs in the same village had successfully secured the SGSY loan earlier.
In such a context, the success or failure of an SHG to source a subsidy-bearing
bank loan could come to define the self-worth of a group.
In another village, the bank’s rigid adherence to the enterprise clause resulted in
excluding SHGs with Scheduled Caste members from accessing the SGSY loans.
As a number of enterprises existed in the Backward Classes areas of the village
(over ten families owned mosaic stone making businesses), it enabled SHGs with
members from these classes to secure loans easily by showing proof of enter-
prises they already possessed. But the Scheduled Castes were at a disadvantage
as comparable enterprises were absent in their area. The president of one such
SHG said, ‘When we suggested trade in readymade garments as a possible
enterprise activity, he [the manager] asked us to show the retail store.’ Thatching
roofs with coconut leaves was a common income-generation activity among the
Scheduled Castes but the bank manager said this was not a credible economic
activity to warrant a loan through the SGSY scheme. 
Sometimes the reverse – the degree of flexibility the branch manager shows –
could help ease the labour and costs of fabricating evidence of non-existent 
enterprises. For example, an SHG was able to secure an SGSY loan of
Rs.100,000 without providing evidence of its stated enterprise (rope-making in this
case) because they had an ‘understanding’ bank manager. When another SHG
tried to present evidence in support of the coconut grove it claimed to have
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leased, the manager reportedly brushed it aside and laughingly remarked that he
knew all about their enterprise. In this context, the SHG women perceived a ‘good
manager’, as one who understood their need to subvert the SGSY scheme and
colluded in the subversion, whereas a ‘bad manager’ insisted on strictly 
implementing policy.
The expenses SHGs incur in trying to camouflage the actual uses to which they
put their SGSY loans did not always end after the loan was sanctioned. SHGs are
sometimes required to participate in state-sponsored exhibitions displaying their
products and enterprise. The aim of these is to celebrate the emergence of female
micro-entrepreneurs and SHG-promoted livelihoods. However these meant that
the women had to sustain the fiction of managing enterprises for a longer period,
sometimes incurring further expenses. 
An SHG, which was supposed to have a ‘coconut-grove leasing’ enterprise had to
buy coconuts worth Rs.300 for the sale at the exhibition. They were able to sell
only a few and the rest were left to rot. Two other groups, which claimed to 
manage shoe-making units, had to buy 25 pairs of footwear at a cost of Rs.2,000
(per SHG) from a wholesaler. They had to raise that money through an internal
loan. No more than five pairs could be sold at the exhibition (and only at a profit of
Rs.1 a pair). The BDO directed SHGs to participate in these exhibitions with 
sufficient evidence of their enterprise and threatened to cut the subsidy 
component of the loan if SHGs were reluctant to do so.
All stakeholders involved in SHG promotion and financing are afraid that creating
non-existent enterprises is going to become more complicated, as the district
administration intended to make SGSY loans worth Rs.3 lakhs and Rs.5 lakhs
available to SHGs that had successfully completed repayment of their first loan.
An NGO staff member instructed SHGs at their monthly meeting ‘This time you
really have to take up an enterprise. You can’t cheat authorities the way you have
done so far. Otherwise you won’t get the subsidy.’ Several SHGs had applied for a
mobile phone through a scheme that was supposed to provide them to SHGs
which manage SGSY financed enterprises. This was with the aim of enhancing
women’s access to market information and thereby boosting the viability of their
enterprise. But, not all SHG coordinators were enthusiastic about the scheme.
Gomathi, an SHG’s secretary remarked, ‘The NGO announced that we would get
Rs.5 lakhs next. But I don’t want it. What enterprise will we have to imagine now?
With a cell phone, our calls will be monitored. The cell phone will be proof that we
are not really doing an economic activity. How can we escape scrutiny with a cell
phone? We can only lie once – not ten times. When we lie, we look at each other
and laugh. The NGO staff got angry when I said I didn’t want Rs.5 lakhs and
shouted at me, asking whether it was personal money for me to accept or reject.
The NGO does not understand our dilemma.’
11 The many faces of rent-seeking
In all the cases that I documented, the fee SHGs paid business owners for 
supplying fictitious documents was substantially larger than the bribe they paid the
BDO for sanctioning the subsidy. In some cases, however, BDO officials skilfully
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exploit SHGs which fabricate evidence and obtain further bribes from them.
Sometimes SHGs are required to produce invoices with details of the cost of raw
materials as the evidence of enterprise activity. It is not uncommon for BDO 
officials to act as brokers or intermediaries between women’s groups and local
business interests to secure the needed invoices. And they charge SHGs fairly
large fees for such services. 
An SHG proposing to manage a cement stone manufacturing unit paid Rs.2,000
to a BDO official for an invoice, he is said to have obtained from an ‘engineer’ in a
neighbouring town. Another SHG which was meant to be managing a wedding
decoration rental business paid Rs.7,000 to BDO officials for procuring a relevant
invoice. In this case, the bank manager too supplied an invoice worth Rs.50,000
towards the purchase of chairs. The SHG paid him Rs.3,000 as a bribe. 
The basis on which bribes and payments are made to the bank and the BDO are
different. Payments to the BDO are usually similar to the customary commission
that they routinely extract for any service rendered. With the bank, the implicit
understanding is that the SHG buys the bank’s compliance and willingness to
overlook the subversion. The SHG which applied for a SGSY loan to set up a
wedding decoration rental (on paper) was shocked when the bank manager 
unexpectedly visited them for ‘inspection’ a day after the loan was disbursed.
They lied to him that the goods were on the way and the SHG coordinators paid
him Rs.2,000 and gifted him a box of sweets, the next day at his office. The 
manager’s sudden visit made it clear to the SHG (as well as to other groups in the
village) that the bank expected to be rewarded for ignoring the fabrication of
enterprises. 
A sympathetic bank manager can make a difference to the expenses SHGs incur.
When the SHG (described in Section 10 of this paper) which produced evidence
of a tailoring unit at a cost of Rs.9,000 offered the manager a gift, he declined it
and was in fact dismayed at the large expense the SHG incurred. He regretted his
inability to waive the loan condition of enterprise management as he was account-
able to his seniors. However, he tried to help them to identify any other business
units that might oblige the SHG with ownership documents at a lower price. So, in
the matter of bribes to banks much depends on the individual officer, unlike the
BDO where payments are a routine affair and have little to do with individual 
officials.
The direct linkage loan, being a non-subsidy loan, does not involve any payments
to the BDO. However, seven of the nine SHGs that received the direct linkage
loan, in one of the study villages, purchased expensive gifts for the bank to
express their gratitude. An SHG even presented gifts worth Rs.200 per SHG
member to bank staff for a local religious festival. Although the bank staff 
protested for politeness’ sake, that it was improper and unnecessary for the
women to offers gifts to them, they accepted the gifts. The bank indirectly 
therefore, encourages SHGs to offer them gifts. 
Although SHGs perceive giving gifts as a strategy to advance their relationship
with a crucial benefactor (discussed in Section 9 of this paper), bank payments
are not obligatory, unlike the payments made to the BDO. Thus two SHGs that
received the direct linkage loan did not offer a gift to the bank. The President of
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one of them argued that neither the members of her group nor the bank manager
approved this practice of gift-giving. All SHG members do not perceive it as a 
necessary cost for accessing loans or as an investment to earn the bank’s good
will. In one group, women asked why they were required to spend money on bank
officials who have a regular ‘government salary’. The SHG coordinator, in this
case, silenced the women by saying that a loan of Rs.10,000 per member 
warranted a gift in return to express gratitude. 
In patron-client relationships such as this, it becomes prudent for SHGs (the 
partner with less power) to build ties with the banks (the partner with more power)
through such gestures. And when bank staff accepts gifts it sets a precedent,
which other SHGs are pressured into following. 
12 Spaces for manoeuvre
The dynamics described above give us an understanding of how difficult it is for
women’s groups to resist pressures from or challenge the BDO and banks. As
women are themselves active agents in subverting the enterprise promoting, 
subsidy-bearing schemes, it is difficult to avoid giving bribes or other illegal 
payments. 
The SHGs perceive the BDO largely as an extortionary and corrupt agency 
primarily interested in securing its bribes. However, on certain occasions it could
be an important ally for managing particularly difficult bank officers. Following the
sudden visit of the bank manager to inspect the wedding decoration rental 
business that an SHG was supposedly managing (in the case described in
Section 11), the women appealed to the BDO, which also tried to convince the
manager to be flexible. 
The reverse is also true – the moral support bank officers provide SHGs some-
times helps them reduce their payments to other agencies, the BDO in particular.
SHG women several times appeal to one institution to help mitigate the excesses
of the other. Dealing with multiple institutions provides the space for manoeuvre
as the following case demonstrates.
Jothi, an SHG coordinator, who was successful in reducing her group’s payment
to the BDO, attributed her assertiveness to the local bank manager who had
encouraged SHGs to report the BDO’s demands for bribes. He had often 
reminded them that neither the BDO nor bank officials were entitled to ‘buy 
themselves a cup of tea’ with women’s savings. However, Jothi’s case is an
exception. She was the secretary of a federation of SHGs operating in 54 villages
and had received rights-awareness training from a local NGO. The BDO was
deterred from unduly harassing her SHG as it was likely that she would raise the
issue of illegal payments at federation meetings and other public fora, to which
she had access. 
The BDO is usually cautious and is wary of a conscientious bank manager’s 
disapproval of illegal payments. It routinely instructs all SHGs not to ask or expect
a receipt for the illegal payments they make to the BDO, not to record details of
such payments in their Resolution book and not to report it to the bank manager.
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SHGs usually give the routine bribes to the BDO with their sponsoring NGO as
the mediator. But, in some cases where officials in the BDO excessively harass
SHGs, the NGO too attempts to fight on their behalf. In the administrative block
where I conducted my field study for this paper, some Rural Welfare Officials
(RWO) or Gram Sevaks (village-level functionaries of the BDO) are notorious for
being ruthless about bribes from SHGs. They visit SHGs late in the evenings
promising them to quickly sanction the subsidy if the women immediately paid
them some money. The sponsoring NGO of an SHG raised this issue several
times with the BDO. On one occasion, the NGO director pointed out to the Block
Development Officer that NGO staff had invested considerable resources in 
forming and training the groups. ‘Will your RWO at least give us half the amount
he collects?’ he reportedly asked, in an attempt to shame officials into taking
action against their field-level functionaries. This NGO reported that a former 
officer had at least chastened his subordinates in the presence of NGO staff, but
his successor chose to ignore the NGO’s complaints. 
The presence of multiple institutional actors not only gives some protection to
SHGs from the rent-seeking behaviour of the BDO, but also makes it possible for
them to act autonomously as they have an expanded set of choices. For example,
if SHGs feel they are being victimised by a sponsoring NGO, they can dispense
with the existing ‘sponsoring’ arrangement and seek a new one instead. In one of
the study villages, ten SHGs switched allegiance to the bank from an NGO which
was unscrupulous and exploitative. When the SHGs complained to the bank 
manager about the NGO’s continuous demands for payments, the manager asked
them not to be ‘dependent’ on the NGO. He offered his support for supervising
group accounts and sanctioning bank loans. In this case, the bank willingly
assumed the responsibility of SHG promotion in addition to its role as banker to
the groups. The branch manager invested considerable time and effort attending
monthly village-level SHG meetings, auditing SHG account books and building the
SHGs’ ability to maintain accounts.33 And the SHGs were grateful to the bank for
having facilitated their escape from an NGO that was seen as unaccountable and
corrupt.34
Although some SHGs continued to remain formally associated with the sponsoring
NGO, they distanced themselves from the NGO increasingly, for example, by not
attending NGO-sponsored meetings. They instead focused their energies on
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33 SHG promotion also requires the bank’s involvement to troubleshoot and mediate intra-SHG conflicts. 
An intra-SHG dispute about repayments of the SGSY loan was discussed in the presence of the bank 
manager and was eventually resolved after a three-hour session which extended well beyond closing 
hours of the bank. At the end of the session, the exhausted bank manager reportedly commented that 
he had not talked to his wife as much in the 16 years of his marriage as he had with the SHG women.
In my study, the commitment of the branch bank manager was reflected in the bank’s conscientious 
execution of its role as sponsoring agency. Other studies however show that banks may attempt to 
minimise the costs of SHG promotion through fewer village visits, spending lesser time on monitoring 
SHGs and by not providing training to SHG coordinators and members (Srinivasan 2000).
34 In the administrative block in which the study was conducted, the state-sponsored Mahalir Thittam 
scheme experienced an initial phase of difficulty in identifying a reliable partner NGO. Two NGOs that 
were initially entrusted with this responsibility were reportedly dishonest and made frequent demands 
from SHGs to meet real or imagined expenses associated with SHG promotion.
strengthening relationships with banks. Where SHGs have a good rapport with the
financing bank, their perceived utility of maintaining a relationship with the 
sponsoring NGO significantly diminishes. In any case, SHGs ‘evaluate’ sponsoring
NGOs (which also judged themselves), in terms of their effectiveness in ensuring
a relatively smooth access to bank loans. One of the NGO staff explained that the
NGO-SHG relationship was usually strong for the first six to eight months. This is
usually the time it takes to procure the Revolving Fund loan. The relationship then
tends to weaken as the SHG establishes an independent relationship with the
bank. Consequently, NGOs often complain of the ‘fickleness’ and ‘ingratitude’ of
SHGs. At a meeting of SHG coordinators, an NGO staff criticised SHG women for
their inherent ‘opportunism’ and willingness to switch loyalties from one sponsor to
the next in order to get the ‘Form 3’ (the subsidy-sanction form of the SGSY loan)
processed.
SHGs also switched accounts from one bank to another if a particular bank was
unwilling to finance them. In the administrative block where I carried out my field
study, a nationalised bank, which was perceived as ‘SHG-friendly’ because of the
relative ease with which it provided loans had attracted more than 100 SHGs from
the surrounding villages. This bank had allocated one day of the week to 
exclusively deal with SHG customers. Overall, it can be seen that SHGs’
decisions about maintaining a relationship was based on their assessment of the
relative costs and benefits of the relationship, as well as the choices available.
Where the costs outweigh benefits, or where a relationship appears to have 
outlived its usefulness, SHGs plan strategies to disengage from it.
13 The political economy of loan 
access
As SHGs have proliferated and the funds available from schemes such as the
SGSY are limited, inter-SHG competition to secure subsidy-bearing loans is
inevitable. NGOs that sponsor SHGs outside the ambit of the state-partnership
scheme often allege unfair competition from ‘state-legitimised’ NGOs. The latter
group secure loans (especially subsidy-bearing loans) more easily for the SHGs
they sponsor because of a reported ‘nexus’ with the bank and the BDO. Banks
sometimes refuse outright to lend to SHGs sponsored by NGOs that do not
belong to the state-partnership. At times they also disallow opening bank accounts
for their SHGs stating that they have instructions to work only with ‘government’
groups. In some administrative blocks where the BDO directly sponsors SHGs,
the designated state-partner NGOs complain that the BDO discriminates against
them and that it sanctions loans in favour of its own groups.
In this context, SHGs find it hard to resist official directives from the BDO to attend
public events organised at the block and district headquarters, which are 
sometimes attended by prominent people. NGOs that partner with the state are
particularly susceptible to these pressures. However, several non-partner NGOs
too cannot resist them, as they do not wish to antagonise the local administration. 
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35 The panchayat-level sanitary complex scheme aims to promote the health and wellbeing of rural 
women. According to the scheme, each complex is constructed at a cost of Rs.2 lakhs and should 
consist of 10 toilets and 3 cubicles for bathing. While charges for water consumption and the costs of 
maintaining pumpsets were to be borne by the village panchayat, the daily maintenance of the 
complex was entrusted to women’s SHG (source: www.tn.gov.in/policynotes/archives/policy2002-
03/rural2002-03-IV.htm).
36 This was reported by the NGO which quit the State-NGO partnership (Mahalir Thittam scheme) after a
year of participation.
Women say that attending such frequent meetings, which are usually announced
at short notice, are a significant cost that participating in an SHG brought. The
general perception is that women’s participation at meetings is relatively costless
for authorities. As one SHG member said, ‘If you want men’s presence at 
meetings, you need to provide transport, lunch and liquor. SHG women, on the
other hand, organise their own transport, bring food along and come free – all
expenses are met by the resources of the SHG.’
The control the BDO exercises over sanctioning the subsidy is also resented by
SHGs because the BDO also enlists their participation in managing other village-
level government schemes. Although women valued the opportunity to acquire
information about the workings of government departments and programmes at
schemes local levels, they were wary of responsibilities being imposed, especially
when they involved schemes that were flawed in their implementation. 
In several villages, women protested when SHGs were asked to assume 
responsibility for managing the sanitary complex, which provides toilets and 
facilities for washing and bathing for women.35 SHGs had to collect Rs.5 per
household from the village community for regular maintenance of the toilets. The
SHGs considered this an impossible task as no one was willing to pay. In one 
village, an SHG coordinator refused to take the keys of the complex and by 
implication, the responsibility for its management. She alleged that corruption and
leakage of funds allotted for construction of the complex had made it unusable.
Thus, pressures upon SHGs to assume responsibility for the monitoring of village-
level government schemes suggest the possible over-burdening of SHGs with 
fulfilment of government programmes and without monetary compensation for the
additional burden.
In some cases, BDO officials also dissuade women from actively participating in
local protests and action which challenge state inefficiencies, for example, in 
providing public services or those which directly challenge state policies. A case in
point is the protest against the sale of liquor that is promoted by the state and is a
large source of revenue for the Tamil Nadu government. One District Collector
reacted to a state-partner NGO organising a series of street-level, anti-liquor
demonstrations by admonishing it for ‘bringing women to the streets rather than
just giving petitions to appropriate authorities.’36
On one hand the state’s agenda of microcredit promotion entails official 
commitment to empower poor women through credit-based self help activities.
However, on the other hand it carries the risk of co-opting independent initiatives
which use SHG networks to mobilise women for public action towards gender 
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justice and social change. Some women’s organisations in Tamil Nadu which have
organised women for several years with an explicit gender rights perspective have
also, in recent years, tried to use the opportunity provided by SHGs to create 
sustainable grassroots women’s collectives. However, they struggle to operate in
this environment to sustain economic benefits for women as well as simul-
taneously challenge the hegemonic purposes for which state authorities can use
credit-disbursal.
This paper so far has dealt with the sources of conflict and friction in the co-
production relationship SHGs have with banks and the state agencies. In the 
following section, I provide a brief account of the incentives for the banks, the
BDO and women’s SHGs which motivate these institutional actors to sustain their
relationship despite the tensions. 
14 Incentives for the stakeholders
14.1 Incentives for banks
In Section 2 of this paper, I briefly mentioned the role RBI and NABARD play in
promoting SHG-banking. I also mentioned the policy incentives that motivate 
commercial banks to undertake banking with SHGs. 
A former RBI governor said SHG-banking was evolving in a macro policy environ-
ment which was marked by concerns for revitalising rural financial institutions that
had been damaged by the ‘twin problems of non-viability and poor recovery 
performance’ (Rangarajan 1997). One influential factor in generating official 
interest in the development of the linkage programme have been studies that
showed significantly lower transaction costs for the lending institution and
improved repayment rates if SHGs and NGOs were involved in various stages of
financial intermediation (Puhazhendi 1995). A NABARD manual for branch-level
bank officials tries to impress upon them the multiple advantages of SHG-banking.
It presents it as something which could potentially extend beyond reducing loan
servicing costs to grow into ‘big business over a period of time’ as it simultan-
eously increased the ‘social base of the bank in rural areas’ (NABARD undated).
An important message within the banking sector is that SHG-banking is profitable
and helpful to the bank officer struggling to fulfil the ‘social banking’ mandate of a
developmental state. 
A roundtable discussion among leading microfinance practitioners in India pointed
to the growing significance of a ‘demand pull’ as banks responded to grassroots
demands for credit from increasing numbers of SHGs. Moreover, for banks the
competition is high in over-saturated urban markets. This combined with the 
realisation that NGOs could be gateways to a large market of low income house-
holds has urged banks to capture markets for financial services among the rural
areas (Srinivasan and Sriram 2003). Recently, the scaling up of microfinance
services to reach an estimated $30 billion market in India37 has attracted private-
sector banks (both Indian and transnational) such as the ICICI, HSBC and ABN
Amro. These banks have innovated lending models by using microfinance 
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institutions as collection agents to give loans to the rural poor people. They in turn
benefit from expanding their retail operations to rural areas without incurring the
expense of establishing an infrastructure.38
While banks as institutions gain from the advantages described above, branch
level bank managers and other employees are engaged in day-to-day trans-
actions with SHG women. They negotiate the many pressures of direct inter-
actions and the responsibility of operating numerous small-sized accounts. In this
paper, I have pointed out the other incentives that motivate branch-level bank 
officials to participate in SHG- financing. 
The potential of SHGs retrieving long overdue arrears on former bank loans is an
attractive opportunity. Banks also find that SHGs are valuable allies during difficult
circumstances. For example, the rural branch office of a nationalised bank was to
be closed down as the number of users was declining. The SHGs in the surround-
ing villages successfully campaigned to ‘save the bank’ by encouraging private
individuals and other SHGs to open accounts in the bank. The bank was grateful
to the role that older, established SHGs played in spearheading the campaign. 
The growth of women’s SHGs has created local institutions with a strong vested
interest in the successful performance of public sector bank branches. Local
banks also express their appreciation at the new clientele that women’s SHGs
represent. A bank in one of the study villages invited all the SHGs in the surround-
ing villages and treated them to ‘sweets and coffee’ since the bank was 
sanctioned a new computer after the number of accounts had increased due to
women’s SHGs.
14.2 Incentives for the Block Development Office (BDO)
The DRDA is given the responsibility of managing all nationally-implemented
poverty alleviation schemes including the SGSY, and the BDO’s mandate is to
meet loan disbursal targets for subsidy-bearing schemes such as the SGSY.
However, as this paper shows, the BDO also gains from women’s SHGs. The
SHGs are not only good avenues to implement government-sponsored 
programmes but they also open opportunities for rent-seeking. All SHGs routinely
bribe the BDO to get the subsidy. Some SHGs also have to make large payments
to get the BDO’s help manufacturing proof of non-existent enterprises. The BDO’s
incentive to participate at the field-level in the relationship, in this case, is in direct
conflict with SHGs’ interests. 
The BDO in some parts of Tamil Nadu not only implemented the SGSY scheme
but also functioned as an SHG promoter or sponsoring agency. In the adminis-
trative block where I conducted my field study, the BDO claimed to sponsor close
to 200 SHGs. As SHGs have emerged as an important flagship programme of the
state, it appears to have motivated the BDO to continue with SHG promotion. This
has created competition between state agencies to promote SHGs. 
37 This estimate is provided by Vijay Mahajan, Managing Director of BASIX (Business Week 2006).
38 Duflo (2005). 
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An NGO that was designated a state-partner in the block of the official Mahalir
Thittam scheme, invited the BDO-sponsored SHGs in one of the study villages to
join the state-partnership programme. The BDO quickly intervened to stop the
SHGs from doing so. The BDO was proud of its association with the SHGs in this
village because the women attended all public functions organised by them. The
SHGs had even paid Rs.400 per group to travel in three trucks to attend a public
meeting chaired by the District Collector. According to one SHG coordinator, the
BDO officials told the women, ‘If you stay with us (the BDO), we will help you in
every way.’ And it is evident that women’s groups, in turn, use the BDO’s 
imperative to maintain and strengthen its links with them, to negotiate their own
interests. 
BDO sponsorship, however, is not always good for SHGs. Although it gives them
a relatively easy access to bank loans and quicker information about government
welfare schemes, the BDO lack the infrastructure and personnel to maintain an
ongoing supervision of the SHGs. 
For example, the BDO-sponsored groups in one of the study villages complained
of having effectively been abandoned by the BDO officials, who had stopped 
visiting them after the SHGs were formed. In one of my field visits to these SHGs,
I was faced with a rather extraordinary request from the SHGs coordinators to
‘pose’ as a functionary from the BDO who had been deputed to monitor them
(rather than introduce myself to the SHG members as a ‘student’ or ‘researcher’
from Chennai). The coordinators made this request in the hope of using my visits
to create an impression of external monitoring and supervision, which could 
possibly motivate SHG members and thereby improve repayment performance.
14.3 Incentives for SHGs
Despite the tensions and costs of securing bank loans, a key factor that sustained
SHGs’ association with banks and the BDO (especially to secure SGSY loans)
was that they could successfully subvert the scheme’s objective: enterprise-
management. Since bank loans were distributed equally amongst members
(Rs.5,000 or Rs.10,000 each depending on whether the total loan was
Rs.100,000 or Rs.200,000) each woman received a larger amount than was 
usually available from internal, group-sourced loans. Interestingly, I found in my
research that poorer women in the SHGs received only a limited amount of the
internal, group-sourced loans. The SHGs had informal norms which sanctioned
them a lesser amount as they were generally perceived as less creditworthy. Bank
loans, which were equally distributed, were sometimes the only opportunity for
poorer women in the SHGs to get relatively large loans (Rs.5,000 or Rs.10,000). 
Bank loans are supply-driven and SHGs have no control over the timing when
they receive a loan. This allows women to use such money to fulfil long-term
household needs such as acquiring assets, purchasing jewellery, repaying old
debts and taking up home improvements.39 Women want these loans particularly
because it gives them the freedom to use the money on things that are important
to them. 
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SHGs have also been able to strategically extend the benefits of their relationship
with banks beyond the intended goal of securing loans and accessing credit-
based development schemes. Village-level SHGs are also officially invited to all
public events relating to local governance such as village-level Panchayat 
meetings. SHGs therefore enjoy a higher social status in their communities due
the networks of contacts they develop with these multiple state institutions, banks
and the block development administration. 
Also, women are fairly successful in using the official support for SHGs to gain
access to other state institutions, such as the police. Police stations are more 
willing to register cases of sexual harassment, marital violence and dowry harass-
ment, when these are referred by SHGs rather than when approached directly by
the victim’s family. Some women, in my study, reported that they use the threat of
complaining to the police officially through the SHG (file a complaint using the
SHG letterhead) against abusive husbands or sons-in-law. A few men, in turn,
complained about a ‘nexus’ between women’s SHGs and police stations having
women employees only. They felt SHGs tended to ‘harass’ and ‘shame’ husbands
and parents-in-law by reporting against them to police stations, at their ‘whims’
and ‘fancies’, and ‘even for small offences’.40 One disgruntled husband was angry
with the state for what he felt was its ‘big mistake’ of openly supporting equal
rights for women through SHGs and police stations run by women only.
Exhibitions that the local administration organises showcase enterprises which are
financed by SGSY loans. They publicly demonstrate the official support SHGs
enjoy. Commenting on an exhibition at the BDO, one SHG member said, ‘Women
were swarming the BDO for a whole week. The sight of women supervising stalls
filled us with pride and made men wonder at us with envy.’ It did not seem to 
matter that SHGs did not in reality own or run the enterprises on display, because
the exhibition generally was a powerful way to convey what women could achieve. 
The perception that women are able to use SHGs to gain privileged access to
state institutions is fairly widespread. For example, at a public event organised as
part of a state-sponsored literacy programme, a male participant argued that men
needed to organise their own SHGs for unity, strengthening their bargaining power
and countering the perceived public successes of women’s SHGs. Several men in
the audience appreciated and applauded this comment.
The strong links between women’s groups and state institutions helps them to get
round local interests and power structures. For example, one traditional village
headman angry with the SHGs’ visits to the police station and their increasing role
in mediating local disputes, verbally abused the women and challenged their right
to participate at Panchayat meetings. The SHGs reported this to the District
39 In marked contrast, internal or group-sourced loans, which are demand-driven in nature are used for 
immediate, emergent needs. My study found that 41 per cent of total amount of bank loans was used 
for acquiring assets relative to 24 per cent of internal loan amount. The data on loan use was 
collected for a total of 495 loans borrowed by 97 SHG members.
40 The first police station to be staffed by women only was introduced in Chennai in 1992, to create an 
institutional environment that would encourage women victims of abuse and violence to seek redress. 
Currently, there are 196 such women only police stations in Tamil Nadu.
IDS WORKING PAPER 303
37
Collector who ordered the BDO and the District Superintendent of Police to 
intervene. The village headman was warned to not interfere with SHG affairs. 
Women have thus gained not only from the financial assistance offered by SHGs
or from the emergence of organised collectives of grassroots women. Importantly,
women have also gained from the widespread perception among rural communi-
ties that the state is committed to the development of women’s SHGs and that
these groups enjoy the support and backing of the state. This has been achieved
to a large extent by the active involvement of several state agencies in co-
production relationships involving the promotion and financing of SHGs.
15 Some points for reflection
This paper has tried to showcase the multiple pressures SHGs face while trying to
access bank loans, as a result of the institutional requirements of different actors.
This paper suggests that the co-production arrangements between SHGs seeking
bank loans and other agencies were informed by the dominant ideologies of caste
and gender. It was seen that bankers’ tendency to invoke women’s kinship and
household-related identities to ensure repayment of loans borrowed by their male
kin resulted in ‘bank-induced drop-outs’, conflicts within SHGs and household-
level tensions for SHG members. The assumption by the bank and the BDO
(described in Sections 9 and 13 respectively) that women’s time and labour were
freely available betrayed insensitivity to multiple demands upon women demanded
by household survival in contexts of material deprivation and gendered work 
allocation. As described in Section 6, bank reluctance to finance SC SHGs on the
same scale as their BC counterparts caused much resentment among the former,
until a compromise was arrived at. Eventually, bankers’ fears and caste-based
assessments of repayment behaviour were belied by conscientious repayment of
bank loans by all SHGs. 
The pressures and concerns of the institutions at the time of promoting SHG-
banking have to be factored in too, to understand the dynamics underlying the
interactions between women’s groups and other institutions. Women, for example,
demand loans from banking institutions at a period when banks have become
increasingly susceptible to the pressures of cost-recovery, portfolio quality,
profitability and performance. The spread of SHGs coincided with the inception of
banking sector reforms introduced as part of financial liberalisation since the early
1990s. Women have had to deal with overworked, irritable bank managers who
struggled to operate understaffed rural branches that were being debilitated by
retirement schemes undertaken as part of retrenchment in the public sector.
The interactions between SHGs and various institutional actors need to be also
contextualised with reference to broader political dynamics. Employees of the
Block Development Office in Tamil Nadu, for instance, try to ‘politically manage’
SHGs in a context where the SHG programme is widely perceived as a state-
sponsored, state-initiated development agenda. It is in this context that I suggest
(in Section 13 of the paper) that the forms of public action that SHG women
choose to engage in, acquire a political meaning and urgency which can, in turn,
circumscribe their capacity to directly challenge both state and household 
patriarchies.
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This paper therefore emphasises that power dynamics underpin relationships
between poor women seeking credit and the institutions involved in providing it
and that the poor are vulnerable to the imperatives of more powerful institutions.
At the same time, it also suggests the vulnerability of SHGs to development 
policies (such as the SGSY) that legitimise women’s claims to bank credit, but
impose an agenda perceived as irrelevant to the needs and life-circumstances of
SHG women. In this case (as described in Section 10), co-production is success-
fully sustained by the blatant subversion of policy objectives by all parties involved
and by the backdoor entry of a new set of actors – the owners of locally-based
businesses who help SHGs feign productive use of their loans. 
The paper demonstrates, in several instances, that SHGs were not merely 
manipulated by the exigencies of other institutional actors, but also deployed tact
and skill, even subterfuge and lies, where necessary to manoeuvre spaces for
themselves. In a context marked by different players which sponsor SHGs (NGOs
for instance) and those which finance them (the bank), SHGs are able to assert
their autonomy vis-à-vis the former, especially if they enjoyed the support of the
latter. Overall, the presence of multiple institutional actors enabled SHGs to
appeal to one agency to intercede on their behalf against perceived victimisation
by the other.
Finally, I reiterate that research on microcredit demonstrates that microcredit/
finance programmes do not have any inherent quality by which they empower
their women clients or address concerns of poverty alleviation. The ways in which
poor people experience the poverty-reduction or empowerment impacts are 
invariably mediated by the institutional context of these programmes. SHGs in
India have to be located within the matrix of relationships they form with a range
of institutions, in this context. This will hopefully provide a more nuanced under-
standing of how and under what conditions rural women members of SHGs gain
from participating in microcredit programmes.
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Annex I
The 27 SHGs studied were located in three villages marked by diverse livelihood
profiles. Village 1 is one of the poorer and more economically backward villages of
the administrative block in which the study was conducted. An approximate one-
third of the total working population of village 1 is estimated to be dependent on
the beedi industry for its livelihood. Local respondents attributed the centrality of
beedi-dependent livelihoods in the village economy to the non-availability of water
for agriculture, the village pond being so small that it could barely hold water for
five days after a spell of rain. Less than 30 per cent of the village’s population is
officially listed as engaged in agriculture. Importantly, beedi-dependent livelihoods
are unevenly distributed between the castes. Local informants estimate that close
to four-fifths of the Scheduled Castes in the village relied on beedi-rolling as their
predominant livelihood relative to one-fifth of the Backward Castes. Poorer women
among SCs and BCs performed daily wage labour in agriculture, brick kilns and
the construction sector. Additionally, a common form of employment among SC
women of the village is domestic work in the homes of affluent families in the
neighbouring town. 
In marked contrast to village 1, two-thirds of the working population of village 2 is
engaged in agriculture. During good monsoon years, wage work in agriculture was
reported to be available throughout the year in the village on account of multi-
cropping and seasonal cultivation cycles. Local informants pointed to the absence
of any significant agricultural activity (particularly those involving water-dependent
crops such as rice, banana and tomato) in village 1 and village 2 for 4–5 years
prior to the period of study on account of pervasive drought conditions. The 
minority of farmers who owned pump sets had managed to carry on some 
cultivation activity – albeit on a reduced scale. In contrast to villages 1 and 2, the
overwhelming majority of the population in village 3 works in leather-based 
industries in a nearby town. In village 3, the majority of SC women were employed
in footwear manufacturing companies, while caste-related notions of ‘social status’
resulted in the avoidance of such employment by BC women. Table A1 provides
the caste-wise and village-wise break-up of the 27 SHGs. 
A brief note on methodology
Much of the information for this paper is drawn from interviews with the 
coordinators of SHGs. SHG-level coordinators possessed a rich store of 
information on SHGs’ experience of interaction with external agencies, in 
particular the sponsoring NGO, the financing bank and the BDO. All details of any
external loan received by the SHG were obtained from SHG coordinators with a
focus on the process of securing the loans (the financial and other costs involved),
the negotiations with banks, BDO and NGOs in the course of securing the loan,
the stated purpose of enterprise-promotion loans, the actual use of these loans by
group members (where they differed from the stated purpose), the manner of 
distribution of the loan within the group and its repayment. Discussions with 
coordinators also included the attitude of men in the village to the emergence of
SHGs and forms of collective action (if any) initiated by the SHG to address 
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village-level issues. The discussions undertaken with coordinators of 27 SHGs
were wide-ranging and open-ended in nature and conducted over several 
meetings.
In addition to interviews with coordinators, interviews with SHG members were
held with a selected sample of 97 SHG members belonging to 18 SHGs in two (of
the three) villages. The interviews obtained information on the actual loan use of
all loans borrowed (both bank and internal loans), the respondent’s perception of
the SHG’s track record in responding to her credit needs in a timely and adequate
manner, repayment stress faced (if any) when repaying SHG loans and strategies
used to ensure timely repayment of SHG-sourced loans. 
Table A1 SHGs by caste and village
Caste Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 Total
1 SC 5 6 4 15
2 BC 3 2 5 10
3 Mixed (SC & BC) 2 - - 2
Total 10 8 9 27
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